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Governments throughout the OECD and around the world allocate a significant share of societies’ 
capital and risk through their credit-related activities. Those activities include explicit and implicit 
guarantees of too-big-to-fail private and international financial institutions and non-financial firms; direct 
and guaranteed lending; and credit-related insurance and guarantee programmes such as deposit 
insurance. In deciding whether to initiate or modify a credit programme, policymakers consider a broad 
array of political and economic factors. Costs play a prominent role in such deliberations--policies are 
often debated and ultimately justified or rejected on the basis of formal or informal cost-benefit analyses. 
Consequently, accurate cost estimates are a prerequisite for efficient resource allocation, informed and 
transparent government decision-making, and effective management and oversight of government 
programmes. 
This paper explores how OECD governments and government entities determine the official costs 
of their credit-related activities, evaluates those methods against the metric of a “fair-value” approach, 
and illustrates the divergence between reported and fair-value cost estimates through an analysis of 
several major OECD government credit programmes. A fair-value approach measures program costs at 
market prices, or at some approximation thereto when directly comparable market prices are unavailable.1   
The underlying premise--that governments systematically understate the cost of their credit 
activities because they misidentify their cost of capital as being their own borrowing cost--rests on two 
robust principles from financial theory.  The first dates back to Arrow and Debreu (1954) and remains the 
cornerstone of modern-day asset pricing: The cost of capital for any project, public or private, depends on 
the undiversifiable (also often referred to as market or aggregate) risk associated with it. Relative to a unit 
of consumption today, an investment that pays off when the economy is strong is worth less than an 
investment with the same average payout but that pays off when the economy is weak. The second 
                                                     
1  More precisely, the fair value of an asset is the price that would be received if it were sold in what is known as an 
orderly transaction—one that occurs under competitive market conditions between willing participants and that does 
not involve forced liquidation or a distressed sale. The distinction between fair value and market value is particularly 
useful for valuing government assets and liabilities, many of which do not have an exact private sector analog; fair 
value accounting standards provide guidelines for how to handle such cases.  
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principle follows from the related logic of the famous Modigliani-Miller (MM) theorem (Modigliani and 
Miller, 1958) as it applies to governments.2 The MM theorem established that as a first approximation, 
the cost of capital for a project (including financial projects) depends on the timing and undiversifiable 
risks of the associated cash flows, not on the mix of debt and equity used to finance it. Debt and equity 
holders collectively bear the entire undiversifiable risk of a project, and the cost of the total 
undiversifiable risk is the same no matter how it is divided across those claimants. The relevance to the 
government arises from the recognition that the undiversifiable risks inherent in most government credit 
activities are similar to those present in private credit transactions and that those risks are ultimately are 
borne by taxpayers and the general public, who are the de facto equity-holders in government 
investments.3  
The analysis reveals a large divergence between how OECD governments account for the costs of 
credit support and the corresponding fair-value costs: Governments (and government-owned entities) 
systematically understate the costs of credit support, often by a considerable margin. Cost understatement 
has a number of potentially adverse consequences: It encourages over-reliance on credit support relative 
to other types of assistance, such as grants or in-kind transfers, for which costs are measured more fully. 
The impetus to use credit support in lieu of other types of assistance may be particularly strong during 
periods of fiscal consolidation when there is intense pressure to reduce measured spending. Cost 
understatement creates incentives for capital misallocations and overinvestment; and it underreports the 
size of the public sector. Furthermore, it encourages a larger buildup of financial risk by governments 
than would otherwise occur. That in turn increases the likelihood of future funding shortfalls that could 
hinder governments’ capacity to respond to adverse shocks, and adds to the aggregate financial risk in the 
world economy.   
                                                     
2 Cost estimates based on a weighted-average or market cost of capital are often described as fair value estimates, 
and henceforth the terms are used interchangeably.  
3 That perspective was endorsed by the Financial Economists Roundtable (2012), a non-partisan group of senior 
financial economists, but remains controversial among U.S. budget practitioners.   
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The phenomenon of significant cost understatement and several valuation approaches that can be 
used to address it are illustrated through analyses of three OECD examples: (1) the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), a large international financial institution whose disclosures are 
typical of such organizations; (2) the Tennessee Value Authority (TVA), a wholly federally-owned firm 
responsible for about 1/6 of the electrical generation and transmission in the United States; and (3) the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and its successor, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), 
a permanent crisis resolution mechanism established by the euro area Member States as an 
intergovernmental organisation to ensure financial stability by providing financial assistance to ESM 
members experiencing or threatened by severe financing problems. 
This analysis adds to a growing number of studies that address those issues as they pertain to the 
U.S. federal government (Lucas, 2012(a), surveys that literature).  Similar analyses do not appear to have 
been performed for other OECD member states, despite the growing prevalence of government credit 
support by those countries and the significant differences from the U.S. in policies and institutions. The 
aim of this paper is to begin to fill that gap, and to draw attention to the importance of accurate cost 
measurement for credit support in the OECD context and the shortcomings of current practices. A caveat 
is that the conclusions drawn rely on examination of a small subset of the numerous government financial 
reports and budgetary documents where credit cost information may appear, as well as a reading of the 
relevant portions of the International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) and related 
commentaries and conversations with OECD experts. A comprehensive analysis of OECD credit 
programmes and accounting practices was not attempted. Thus there may be important exceptions and 
variations that remain to be identified in future research. 
As noted above, the fundamental conceptual reason for the systematic understatement of credit 
costs by OECD member states and government-owned entities is relatively straightforward: Governments 
generally equate their cost of capital with their borrowing rate, independent of the risk of the activity 
being financed. Relatedly, government entities use an accounting notion of profitability rather than an 
economic one. However, the practical impediments to a full recognition of credit costs are more 
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numerous and complex. They include the panoply of legally binding directives and long-standing 
practices that allow the costs of many credit activities--particularly credit guarantees and other contingent 
commitments—to be entirely unaccounted for in government budgets, or to be accounted for on a cash 
basis that largely obscures the lifetime cost of new obligations at the time they are made. The U.S. federal 
government took the positive step of moving to an accrual basis of accounting for its direct loans and loan 
guarantees programmes, but its use of government interest rates for discounting results in downwardly-
biased cost estimates. Even if one were willing to take reported costs at face value, identifying the 
relevant programmes and uncovering the available cost information is difficult. Reporting practices are 
not standardized, and cost information may be spread across a combination of budgetary accounts, 
financial statements, and special reports issued by multiple reporting entities.    
Despite the complexity and heterogeneity of current practices, it is possible to characterize the 
differences in the information disclosed by government entities and by publicly-traded firms in a way that 
clarifies the relation between financial accounting, budgetary accounting, and market prices. That 
taxonomy represents an original contribution of this paper, and it is useful for several reasons. For one, it 
suggests the importance of recognizing the fair-value costs of credit support in budgetary accounts. 
Government financial statements, even when they include a fair value balance sheet, do not reveal the full 
cost of credit support. The observation is important because whereas government financial accounting has 
become increasingly standardized and is largely consistent with financial accounting practices in the 
private sector as more countries chosen to adopt IPSASB guidelines, international standard setters have 
offered much less guidance on budgetary accounting practices. Furthermore, many OECD government 
credit activities are conducted by entities such as international financial institutions, which evaluate their 
financial performance largely on the basis of data on their financial statements. The fair-value costs of 
their credit activities, which for a publicly traded firm would be reflected in stock price movements, are 
generally not estimated or recognized as relevant. 
Adoption of a fair value approach to cost estimation by governments would involve a number of 
practical challenges. Those include the need to select appropriate methodologies for a variety of 
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applications; the possibility that the resulting cost estimates would be less transparent and more open to 
manipulation than estimates based on simpler rules; and the costs of educating staff members on how to 
prepare and communicate fair value estimates to policymakers and the public. The case is made that those 
costs and risks would be largely mitigated if governments were to adopt the accounting standards and 
practices that have developed to guide and discipline the production of fair value estimates by private 
sector financial institutions.4    
While accurate cost measurement is important for the many reasons noted, it is clearly not 
sufficient for policy evaluation--private benefits and any positive or negative externalities also must be 
taken into account. Although those broader issues are outside of the scope of the analysis here, there is an 
extensive academic literature on the broader effects of government credit support. Government credit 
support can improve social welfare when it alleviates informational and contractual frictions in credit 
markets (e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981, and Williamson, 1994). Credit market frictions and their 
consequences may be particularly severe during periods of financial upheavals. Relatedly, during 
downturns credit policy can be a powerful tool for delivering economic stimulus (Gale, 1991, and Lucas, 
2012b).  Public financing of infrastructure projects may improve welfare when it is infeasible for the 
private sector to collect sufficient revenues from users. Potential adverse effects of credit support include 
the crowding out of more productive investment activities; effects on prices that reduce the benefits to the 
intended beneficiaries; incentives for greater risk taking by guaranteed entities; and a build-up of debt by 
unsophisticated borrowers.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an indication of the size and 
scope of OECD government credit activities. Section 3 reviews the conceptual case for applying a fair-
value approach to cost estimation in government accounting, and explains how credit costs are accounted 
for in practice. It then clarifies the complementary roles of budgetary accounting and financial 
accounting, and compares the information provided therein with information available to investors in 
                                                     
4 For a discussion of the concerns that have been raised about requiring fair value accounting by the private sector 
and a defense of that practice, see Laux and Leuz (2009 and 2010). 
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publicly traded firms that also have information about stock prices. Section 4 reports the fair-value costs 
to governments of the EBRD, the EFSF/ESM, and the TVA, and compares those estimates to the 
government-reported information on their costs. Those analyses demonstrate several of the approaches 
that can be used to estimate the fair-value of government credit support. Section 5 discusses some of the 
practical challenges in implementing a fair value approach and how they might be addressed. Section 6 
concludes.  
 
2. Government Uses of Credit Support  
 
OECD governments provide credit support for many purposes, and by a variety of means. 
Governments provide explicit and implicit guarantees to too-big-to-fail private financial and non-financial 
institutions, and to international financial institutions. Direct government loans and loan guarantees 
programmes provide assistance for housing, education agriculture, small businesses, development, 
energy, trade, and to foreign and subnational governments. Certain government insurance programmes, 
such as those protecting bank deposits and private pension benefits, are effectively credit guarantee 
programmes. Government-owned firms that finance their investments through low-cost debt issuance 
provide credit support to the activities they engage in. 
Cataloguing the size and scope of government credit support for OECD countries using a 
consistent approach across jurisdictions and programmes would be a worthwhile and challenging 
undertaking, but such an exercise has not been done and is not attempted here. Nevertheless, information 
is available that provides a sense of the magnitudes involved, and suggests credit supported by OECD 
governments amounts to several tens of trillions of Euros. 
For the U.S., Lucas (forthcoming) provides an inventory of federal credit support programmes 
which underscores the very large size of those obligations when considered collectively.  Exposures are 
measured by dollar amounts of outstanding of guaranteed obligations. Prominent implicit guarantees are 
included but state and local government obligations are not. That analysis concludes that for 2013, credit 
backed by the U.S. federal government topped $20 trillion. The major components include: traditional 
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direct loans and loan guarantees, primarily for low-income housing and higher education ($2.3 trillion); 
backing for mortgages insured by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac ($5.8 trillion); deposit insurance ($6.2 
trillion); guarantees of private defined benefit pension plans by the Pension Benefit Guarantee 
Corporation (about $2.8 trillion); and implicit guarantees to the Federal Home Loan Banks and the Farm 
Credit System (about $1 trillion). In general, the fair-value cost of those obligations is much smaller.  For 
example, the U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO, 2012) reports that for the estimated $635 billion of 
new direct loans and loan guarantees issued in 2013, the fair-value cost would be $11 billion.5  
 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) presents estimates of outstanding government-
guaranteed bonds and debt of government-related enterprises as a share of GDP for selected OECD 
countries in 2008 and 2012 (IMF, 2012). That graph is reproduced here as Figure 2.1. It shows the 
significant growth in those obligations over that period for almost all of the countries reported. In 2012, 
government-guaranteed bonds reached close to 7 percent of GDP for Denmark and Spain, and exceeded 3 
percent of GDP for 8 of the 10 countries shown. The U.S. tops the list at 51.5 percent of GDP for debt of 
government-related enterprises (because of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), while for 10 of the other 13 
countries shown such debt represents more than 10 percent of GDP. Details are not reported on the uses 
of the funds, but the report notes that in some countries the largest shares go to financial institutions 
including development banks (e.g., Germany) and housing agencies (e.g., Canada and Japan). The IMF 
also notes that in some countries the amounts are likely to be underestimated given data constraints. The 
totals also are not comprehensive in that they do not include various contingent liabilities such as those of 
the European Stability Mechanism. National credit programmes, such as for student loans and deposit 
insurance, also appear to be excluded. 
 
   
Figure 2.1: Outstanding Government-Guaranteed Bonds and Debt of Government-Related Enterprises 
(Percent of GDP) 
                                                     
5 That estimate excludes the cost of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, deposit and pension insurance, contributions to 








Survey information on national direct loan and loan guarantee programmes from 22 OECD 
countries shows a combined total stock outstanding of $2.5 trillion (Hawkesworth, 2010).6  Loan 
guarantees account for $2.3 trillion of the total. Sectors receiving assistance (and their percent of the total) 
included the financial sector (76%); export (10%); other (8%); non-financial, non-agriculture (3%); and 
student loans (3%).  
OECD members rely on international financial institutions, and particularly multilateral 
development banks, to provide credit and other financial support to projects in developing countries and 
regions. Such institutions are chartered by more than one country and hence are subject to international 
law. Individual countries provide capital by purchasing shares in the institutions. They also provide 
“callable capital” which commits them to buy additional shares when sufficiently large losses are 
incurred. In 2012, those institutions collectively held assets totaling more than EUR 1 trillion, as shown in 
Table 2.1.7  
 
Table 2.1: Assets of Selected International Financial Institutions, 2012 
                                                                                                          (EUR billions) 
African Development Bank1  25  
Asian Development Bank2  95  
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development  52 
European Investment Bank 508 
Inter-American Development Bank2  71  
World Bank Group2  
     International Bank for Reconstruction and Development  260 
     International Development Association 123 
     International Finance Corporation  58  
     Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency   1 
1 UA 1 = EUR 1.2 
2 USD 1 = EUR .77 
 
                                                     
6 Includes Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Mexico, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the UK. 
7 Assets reported in dollars are converted to Euros at an exchange rate of EUR.77 per dollar. It is not clear whether 
the debt backing the assets of international financial institutions is included in the IMF calculations of guaranteed 
debt or debt of government guaranteed enterprises. 
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 The data presented confirms the importance of credit support in OECD countries. It also suggests 
that credit assistance in most OECD countries is channeled through the financial sector, whereas in the 
U.S. the assistance is more often targeted to specific purposes through government agencies. 
 
3. Estimating the Cost of Government Credit Programmes 
This section briefly lays out the economic rationale for evaluating the cost of government credit 
programmes on a fair-value basis, and contrasts that approach with the practices that OECD governments 
follow in measuring and reporting credit costs. Most importantly, the differences between the information 
disclosures by government entities and by publicly traded firms are characterized in a way that clarifies 
the relation between financial accounting, budgetary accounting, and market prices. That decomposition 
points to the nature of underreporting under the most common accounting regimes, and suggests how 
accounting practices could be modified to incorporate more complete cost information. 
 
3.1 Rationale for Fair-Value Reporting by Governments 
  Unlike most ongoing government programmes that may be modified by future legislation or 
administrative policy changes (e.g., unemployment benefits may be changed year to year), the terms 
agreed to in a credit contract represent a firm legal commitment that binds the government over the life of 
the contract. Therefore the grant-equivalent measure of cost for a credit contract must represent its 
lifetime cost—the net present value of the associated cash flows from and to the government. Those cash 
flows are inherently uncertain, but they can be characterized by a probability distribution of possible 
outcomes. For a direct loan, when the present value of future cash inflows (from interest payments, fees, 
and repayments of principal) falls short of the principal loaned out, the difference represents a cost to the 
government and a subsidy to the recipient. Similarly for a credit guarantee, when the present value of 
future cash outflows under the contract exceeds the present value of fees and recoveries, then the cost to 
the government is positive and a subsidy is conferred.   
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Present value calculations are quite sensitive to the choice of discount rates, and the results can 
only be meaningfully interpreted if appropriate discount rates are chosen. The discount rates used in the 
private sector take into account time value—that a dollar received today is worth more than a dollar 
received in the future. Private sector discount rates also include a risk premium that compensates 
investors for the risks associated with a particular investment that cannot be easily avoided through 
diversification. Those priced risks include market risk, and in some cases prepayment risk and liquidity 
risk.8   
In practice, there are three basic approaches that are used to incorporate the cost of risk into 
present value calculations: comparable market prices, risk-adjusted discount rates, and option- or 
derivatives-pricing methods.  All derive from the same underlying principles, and therefore should 
provide similar answers if correctly implemented. However, the most reliable and tractable approach is 
likely to vary with the application. For example, for contingent claims such as credit guarantees, it is often 
most straightforward to incorporate an appropriate set of discount rates using a derivative-pricing 
approach.  (Ways in which governments could credibly implement fair value methodologies are discussed 
below in Section 5).    
  Private sector discount rates depend primarily on the risks inherent in a particular investment, 
not on how it is financed: The value of a bank loan which is financed 90 percent by debt and 10 percent 
by equity is approximately the same as if it were financed with 50 percent debt and 50 percent equity.9  
Risk is distributed differently between debt and equity holders in the two financing schemes, but the total 
risk to be shared is the same. Hence the total cost of the risk, reflected in the weighted average cost of 
                                                     
8 Market risk is the aggregate economic risk that remains even after investors have diversified their portfolios to the 
fullest extent possible. Loans and loan guarantees expose the government to market risk because future repayments 
of loans tend to be lower when the economy is performing poorly and losses are more costly for the government to 
absorb. Prepayment risk arises when borrowers have the option to prepay a loan before its final maturity date. The 
prepayment option affects the probability and timing of defaults. Liquidity risk is the risk that market conditions 
may make it difficult to quickly find a buyer for an asset without large price concessions. 
9 This abstracts from the effects of taxes, financial distress, and other financing frictions, but those various effects 
push in different directions and their net effects vary, leaving risk as the central consideration that is relevant to the 
issues discussed here.  
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capital for the bank loan, is unaffected by how it is financed. This is the logic of the famous Modigliani 
and Miller (1958) theorem that remains a cornerstone of finance theory. 
The risks inherent in government credit activities are similar to those in private credit 
transactions, but those risks are ultimately are borne by taxpayers and the general public in place of 
private equity holders. Consider a risky government loan, funded by the issuance of government debt. If 
the borrower repays the loan in full then the proceeds can be used to pay back the debt holders, and if 
there is money left over it can be used to increase other government spending or to reduce taxes. 
However, if the borrower defaults then the debt will be repaid using new tax revenues or reductions in 
other government spending. Taxpayers and the public are effectively equity-holders (albeit with unlimited 
liability) in government investments and bear the associated risks.  
As we will see, the direct practical consequence of treating taxpayer-supplied equity as free is that 
countries’ budgetary costs are downwardly biased, and the profits reported by government firms in their 
financial disclosures are upwardly biased. Those biases will be largest for credit activities that involve 
relatively large exposures to undiversifiable risk, such as government guarantees to financial institutions, 
and for government firms that achieve a very low borrowing cost because of public backing.  
 
3.2 Current OECD Practices in Budgetary and Financial Reporting for Credit 
 
The problems of incomplete and inconsistent cost measurement are more acute for credit support 
than for most other types of government spending because credit provision involves uncertain cash flows 
that often extend out over many years. That complexity, combined with the fact that governments tend to 
produce credit services in-house rather than purchasing them from financial institutions, creates latitude in 
how the costs of credit are measured and reported. Consequently, myriad approaches and formulas are 
used by OECD governments and government entities for estimating and reporting credit costs.  
Budgetary costs are of particular importance because it is in the budget process that policymakers 
make tradeoffs between competing spending priorities. Whereas for government financial reporting there 
has been a move towards common standards across countries and with the private sector, there appears to 
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have been little effort to harmonize budgetary accounting across countries.10 Nevertheless, for the purpose 
of understanding the most common budgetary practices and their main strengths and weaknesses, the 
various accounting approaches can be broadly characterised as: (1) off-budget; (2) cash basis; and (3) 
accrual basis. 
Off-budget. For an important subset of OECD countries, some or all credit-related costs are 
omitted from national budgets. Survey data (Hawkesworth, 2010) indicates that for loan guarantees, no 
budgetary expenditures are reported apart from administrative fees for Canada, UK, Slovak Republic, 
Australia and Turkey.  For direct loans, no expenditures apart from administrative fees appear for Canada, 
UK, Spain, Germany, Austria, Slovak Republic, Portugal and Turkey.11 The survey responses also 
indicate that during the global financial crisis, some countries ignored general procedures due to the 
extreme circumstances or made adjustments to their standard procedures.12 
Cash basis accounting. Those credit activities that are considered budgetary are most often 
accounted for by OECD countries on a cash basis. Cash accounting entails reporting the cash flows 
associated with a direct loan or credit guarantee in the years that they are realised.  
Cash-basis accounting for credit has significant and widely recognized weaknesses. It delays 
recognition of the full cost of credit support until many years after the commitments are made, when cost 
information is most decision-relevant to policymakers. It distorts comparisons between the subsidies 
associated with economically equivalent direct loans and loan guarantees. Newly guaranteed loans may 
actually appear to make money because typically the government receives fees upfront and only bears the 
costs of defaults years later, often outside of the time horizon covered by the budget. By contrast, direct 
loans show a large upfront cost when principal is disbursed, even for loans that are likely to be repaid in 
                                                     
10 The International Public Accounting Standards Board endorses the use of accrual for budgetary accounting but 
does not require it: “The Cash Basis IPSAS encourages an entity to voluntarily disclose accrual based information, 
although its core financial statements will nonetheless be prepared under the cash basis of accounting. An entity in 
the process of moving from cash accounting to accrual accounting may wish to include particular accrual based 
disclosures during this process.” 
11 Some countries (e.g., Norway and Denmark) report that no expenditures appear, but seem to contradict that by 
indicating that subsidy costs and write-offs of bad loans are reported. Presumably this reflects differences across 
programmes. 
12 The respondents for Denmark and Netherlands said they ignored the rules; those for Hungary, Finland, Mexico, 
Germany, Turkey, and the UK said they adjusted them. 
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full. Loans with high expected default rates appear initially to be no more costly to make or guarantee 
than those extended to the safest borrowers. Furthermore, cash accounting does not recognise the effects 
of time or risk on the value of cash flows.  
A possible response to the shortcomings of cash-basis accounting is to simply not report credit 
costs in national budgets. However, excluding credit from budgetary accounts creates other problems, 
including that total government expenditures are underreported and that credit support becomes less 
transparent than other forms of spending. A more satisfactory alternative is to switch to an accrual basis 
of accounting for credit. When properly implemented, accrual accounting addresses all of the concerns 
noted above, although it has the disadvantages of somewhat complicating the preparation and 
interpretation of budgetary estimates.   
Accrual accounting.  Budgetary accruals measure the lifetime cost of new credit support in the 
year a commitment is made. Accruals are calculated by projecting the future cash flows associated with a 
loan or guarantee and discounting them to the present. Despite its conceptual advantages over cash 
accounting, the U.S. is the only major OECD country that appears to have adopted accrual accounting for 
activities classified as credit programmes.13 That change, which took effect in 1996, represented a major 
improvement over the cash basis budgeting that preceded it. However, the implementation has some 
shortcomings—primarily the use of Treasury rates for discounting--that cause costs to be underreported, 
and that create inconsistences across the way functionally similar programmes are accounted for.14  
The picture is brighter for financial reporting. The International Public Sector Accounting 
Standards Board (IPSASB) has promulgated accounting standards for public entities that are similar to 
                                                     
13 The U.S. budgetary system also includes a system of supporting accounts that are necessary to reconcile 
budgetary accruals for credit with the subsequently realized cash flows. As part of that reconciliation process, and to 
provide information about the accuracy of the initial cost projections, periodic cost reestimates that reflect realized 
cash flows and updates of projected cash flows are also reported. However, those reestimates do not affect the 
reported budget surplus or deficit.  
14 The stipulation in the law that U.S. Treasury rates be used for discounting causes those estimates to be a less-than-
comprehensive measure of cost. For a few credit-related programs, most notably the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
enacted to respond to the 2007 financial crisis, the law requires budgeting to be on a fair value basis, which replaces 
discounting at Treasury rates with discounting at market-based rates. Other major U.S. credit support is classified as 
insurance and is budgeted for on a cash basis. Legislation has been passed in the House of Representatives that 




the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) that apply to private sector entities, but that allow 
specific differences that accommodate features special to public enterprises. Many OECD countries and 
government institutions have adopted some or all of IPSASB guidelines. Importantly, because it 
incorporates IFRS rules that require financial institutions to report balance sheet information on a fair-
value basis, the IPSASB standards implicitly accept the relevance of market prices to governments. As a 
result of adopting those standards, government institutions such as multilateral development banks 
disclose a significant amount of information on their credit exposures and the value of loans and other 
financial holdings. However, as explained next, financial statement disclosures do not reveal the full cost 
of the credit support provided, and they were not designed to do so. 
 
3.3 Extracting Cost Information: the Role of Budgetary Accounting, Financial Reporting, and Market 
Prices 
 
An important question is how much can be gleaned about credit support costs from budgetary 
reports and financial statements, and how that information differs from what is available for publicly 
traded firms? The answer is shown here to depend on the budgetary accounting rules for credit support. 
Only when budgetary accounting is on a fair-value basis is the information provided equivalent to what is 
available for publicly traded firms. 
It is useful to begin with a reminder of the different functions of government budgetary reports 
and financial statements. Budgets record a government’s annual expenditures and receipts, primarily on a 
cash basis. Budgets are used to set spending priorities, and budgetary totals feed into the calculation of a 
country’s official deficit.  
Financial statements are designed to give a picture of the operations and overall financial health 
of a public or private sector enterprise. They also provide commentary on an enterprise’s risk exposures. 
Financial statements include a balance sheet, which shows assets and liabilities; an income statement, 
which recognizes various categories of revenues and expenses generally using accrual concepts; and a 
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statement of cash flows, which tracks actual cash flows associated with different categories of receipts 
and payments.  
Financial statements only provide partial information about the cost of capital: they treat interest 
payments on borrowed funds as an expense, but make no mention of the required return to equity capital. 
Instead, the difference between revenues and expenses is reported as earnings, which is an indication of 
the value accruing to equity holders. A government enterprise is generally referred to as “profitable” if 
those earnings are positive, even if they are insufficient to provide a fair rate of return on equity. Put 
differently, “economic profits” are only considered positive if returns exceed the weighted average cost of 
capital, whereas accounting profits are positive if returns exceed the cost of debt financing. 
For a publicly traded firm, the fact that accounting profits exclude a return on equity is less 
consequential because of the availability of stock price information. Stock prices reveal whether the 
market views a firm’s earnings as providing a fair rate of return to equity; when earnings fall short stock 
prices decline, and conversely when earnings exceed the required return. For that reason, a firm 
announcing a positive accounting profit may nevertheless see its stock price drop.  
For national governments, budgetary cost estimates are the closest substitute for the information 
in stock price changes. Ideally, the budgetary cost of a programme represents the value of public 
resources committed to it. For grants and transfers, cash accounting achieves that objective. For credit 
support, budgetary accounting only represents the value of public resources committed—and stands in for 
the information in stock price changes for private firms--when it is carried out on a fair-value accrual 
basis. Because that is generally not the case, policymakers lack the cost information that is available to 
their private sector counterparts. 
For a government firm or international financial institution, the information in its financial 
statements is more salient to its decision-making than the budgetary information about it that is reported 
by national governments. For those enterprises, even when financial reporting is on par with the best 
private sector practices and it includes a fair-value balance sheet, the full cost of credit activities is not 
likely to be recognized because of reliance on the accounting definition of profitability. 
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This line of reasoning suggests two main conclusions. Firstly, if governments were to report the 
budgetary costs of credit support on a fair-value basis, then the combination of financial reporting and 
budget estimates would provide information that at least in principle is similar to the information 
available to investors and mangers of publicly traded firms through financial reports and stock prices. The 
second is that for government firms and international financial institutions, even when financial reports 
conform to IFRS guidelines, the cost of capital is generally not measured or reported, and there is often a 
misplaced emphasis on accounting profitability that is likely to have real effects. 
 
4. Quantifying Fair-Value Costs 
To demonstrate some of the approaches that can be used to evaluate the fair-value cost of 
government credit support, and to compare the resulting cost estimates with the cost information 
disclosed under current budgetary and financial accounting regimes, three examples are analyzed: (1) the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD); (2) the U.S. Tennessee Valley Authority 
(TVA); and (3) the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the successor European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM).  
Those examples were chosen with several considerations in mind. A substantial amount of credit 
assistance from OECD governments is channeled through international financial institutions such the 
EBRD, as shown in Section 2. The EBRD’s structure, activities and financial disclosures are typical of 
those types of institutions, and the results are therefore suggestive of the costs for other development 
banks. With regard to TVA, although quite a bit has been written on the fair-value costs of U.S. 
government credit programmes, much less attention has been paid to the cost of credit support delivered 
through non-financial government firms. TVA serves as an example of how large credit subsidies are 
conveyed through government firms in the U.S. and elsewhere, and how those costs are obscured by 
current budgetary and financial reporting practices.  The EFSF and ESM were chosen because of the size 
and importance of those facilities and because costs estimates do not appear to have been previously 
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attempted. That analysis also illustrates the greater challenges involved in estimating the cost of open-
ended contingent guarantee programmes. 
 
4.1 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
The EBRD is an international financial institution that was established in 1991 to provide 
financial support for projects that “foster innovation and build sustainable and open market economies 
from central Europe to central Asia and in the southern and eastern Mediterranean.”15  It supports such 
projects with loans, equity investments, and guarantees. It also holds a portfolio of safe assets for 
liquidity, and it uses derivatives to hedge against interest rate and currency risk. Assets totaled EUR51 
billion in 2012, of which EUR18.8 billion were loan investments in its banking portfolio.  
The capital structure of the EBRD is similar to that of other large international financial 
institutions. The bank relies on mandatory equity contributions and so-called “callable capital” from its 
members to obtain low borrowing costs on the debt issued. Callable capital represents firm commitments 
from members to purchase additional shares up to an agreed upon maximum, should capital infusions 
become necessary.  
The EBRD is owned by 64 countries, the European Union and the European Investment Bank. A 
member’s equity stake consists of its paid-in capital plus cumulative returns, which may be negative. 
Table 5.1 shows the 2012 capital subscription (the sum of paid-in and callable capital) of the top 12 
equity holders, which collectively accounted for about 70 percent of total subscriptions. The ratio of 
members’ paid-in capital, reserves and surpluses; to its outstanding loans, share investments and 
guarantees; is required to be above 50 percent. Under the callable capital arrangement, members are 
obligated to increase their equity stakes if required by the Bank’s Board of Governors. Effectively, equity 
holders provide the EBRD with a free call option. The callable capital creates a substantial cushion for its 
debt against default. Because of those protections, the EBRD is able to issue debt in international capital 
markets that has consistently carried an AAA rating. 
                                                     
15 EBRD Annual Report, 2012. 
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Capital calls are infrequent, but they do occur. For example, the EBRD Board authorized a capital 
call in 2010 to comply with its statutory capital requirement. It increased paid-in shares immediately by 
EUR1 billion and increased authorized callable capital shares by EUR9 billion. There are provisions in 
the law for redeeming callable shares in the future if the bank has sufficient capital, but it appears that 
equity purchases are essentially non-refundable cash expenditures by member countries.  
Table 4.1: Top Capital Contributors to the EBRD 









United Kingdom 2,556,510 
Russian Federation 1,200,580 
Canada 1,020,490 
Spain 1,020,490 
European Investment Bank    900,440 
European Union    900,440 
 
4.1.1 Financial Reporting 
 
In reporting its financial results, the EBRD generally follows IPSASB guidelines. Consequently, 
the EBRD’s reporting is quite informative about the value of its assets and liabilities, which it reports at 
fair value as well as book value. Not surprisingly, the return on equity is considerably more volatile when 
reported on a fair-value basis, as shown in Table 4.2. The EBRD also enumerates its various risk 
exposures, and provides data that could inform a quantitative estimate of that exposure. For example, the 
Bank reports the distribution of investments by credit risk category, by country and by industry. 
As is standard in government and private sector financial reporting, the only component of capital 
costs that is recognized in the EBRD’s income statement is its interest costs. Those interest costs are 
much below the full cost of capital for the bank, which includes a fair return on equity and the annualized 
cost of callable capital. Put differently, the EBRD is reported to be profitable on an accounting basis in 
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any year where the return on equity is positive, whereas it is only profitable on an economic basis if the 
average return on equity and callable capital exceeds a fair rate of return. 
Table 4.2: Returns to members' equity, fair value vs. book value 
 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 
Return on members' equity--IFRS basis* 8% 0% 12% -2% -15% 
Return on members' equity--Realised basis* 7% 5% 8% 2% 3% 
Source: EBRD Financial Report 2012 
 
*The IFRS basis corresponds to fair value returns, and the realised basis is a book value measure. 
 
4.1.2 Fair value vs. Reported Cost of Capital 
A straightforward way to estimate the fair-value cost of capital for an enterprise such as the 
EBRD is to identify the cost of capital for private-sector firms in a similar line of business.16 The 
calculation of the weighted average cost of capital here relies on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
and a typical asset beta for the banking industry. The EBRD’s activities are clearly similar to, but not 
identical to, those of private financial institutions. On the one hand, it is possible that the EBRD is 
exposed to more credit risk than a typical bank because it finances projects whose sponsors have had 
difficulty obtaining private sector funding. On the other hand, in some case those risks may be mitigated 
by the superior enforcement mechanisms available to the EBRD as compared to local banks. To the 
extent that any additional risk is largely idiosyncratic (e.g., arising from economic shocks to small 
countries), it would not affect the asset beta or the cost of capital calculation.  
The components of the weighted average cost of capital calculation for the EBRD in 2012 are 
summarized in Table 4.3. The asset beta is set to 0.3, based on global data on banks over the last five 
years provided by Professor Damoradan.17 The market risk premium (the difference between the short-
term risk free rate and the required return on the stock market) is set to 6.5 percent, consistent with 
historical returns data and typical industry assumptions about this parameter. The 3-month government 
borrowing rate, which represents the risk-free rate, is set to .0003, consistent with the low interest rates in 
                                                     
16 The approach applied in this section is commonly used by financial practitioners and is recommended by standard 
corporate finance textbooks. 




that year. Together, those assumptions imply a required return on assets is .0003 + .3(.065) =1.98 percent. 
Multiplying the required return on assets by the value of bank assets implies a cost of capital for the year 
of (.0198)(EUR 52 billion) = EUR 1.03 billion.  
The total annual financing cost implied by this calculation is about three times the cost of debt 
financing that appears in the EBRD’s income statement. In its 2012 Annual Financing Report, the EBRD 
shows borrowing costs inclusive of hedging expenses of 0.89 percent on its debt of EUR 37.1 billion, 
which implies a borrowing cost of EUR 331 million. The difference—EUR 699 million (EUR 1030 
million – EUR 331 million) is the unreported capital cost for 2012. The corresponding unreported capital 
cost for 2011 is EUR 716 million. 
 
Table 4.3: Calculating the Weighted Average Cost of Capital for the EBRD 
 2012 2011 
Interest Expenses 155 145 
Hedging Expenses 176 118 
Assets (Fair value, EUR millions) 52,015 46,622 
Total Debt (Fair value, EUR millions) 37,106 33,724 
Borrowing cost (interest plus hedging) 0.89% 0.78% 
Risk Free Rate (3-month t-bill) 0.03%  0.15% 
Market risk premium 6.50% 6.50% 
Asset Beta .3 .3 
Required Return on Assets 1.98% 2.1% 
Unrecognized capital subsidy  699 716 
All euro amounts are in millions 
 
 
4.1.3 The Value of Callable Capital 
 
The unrecognized capital costs reported in Table 4.3 include the annual required return on the 
EBRD’s callable capital. However, to understand the fair-value cost to a government of entering into a 
new or incremental callable capital arrangement that will remain in force indefinitely, it is useful to be 
able to estimate the value of that standalone commitment over a longer time horizon. The estimates 
presented here can be interpreted as fair-value accruals, and the derivatives pricing approach used to 
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calculate them illustrates a flexible methodology that government analysts could adopt to budget for the 
cost of new callable capital commitments (in lieu of the current off-budget treatment that represents them 
as costless).18 
The cost of callable capital for the EBRD is estimated using a derivatives-pricing approach that 
builds on Lucas and McDonald (2006, 2010), modified to replace bankruptcy events with periodic and 
stochastic draws on member capital. The cost has the interpretation of being the present value of future 
capital infusions associated with capital calls. The model builds on the basic insights in Merton (1974, 
1977), and on the extensions of Crosbie and Bohn (2003) to a more complex capital structure. The basic 
idea is that adverse shocks may cause asset value, and hence equity value, to fall below a threshold that 
causes a capital call to restore target equity ratios and thereby protect debt holders from losses. The call 
option exposes governments to significant market risk, and its value reflects that it is most likely to be 
exercised when the economy is weak and the cost of capital is high. The model is dynamic, and 
incorporates that over time the EBRD will tend to adjust its leverage, but those adjustments are gradual 
and can only partially offset exogenous shocks to risky asset values. Appendix I describes the model and 
its parameterization in more detail. 
The model is calibrated using EBRD financial data for 2012. Asset volatility, which is not 
directly observable, is a critical parameter affecting guarantee value. For publicly traded firms, asset 
volatility can be inferred from market data using a derivatives pricing approach, but for government firms 
that data is not available. For the EBRD, the annual standard deviation of asset values used in the 
guarantee cost calculation is .075, which is based on the standard deviation of the reported fair-value 
equity of .104 from Table 4.2, and an assumed standard deviation for debt values of .03, weighted by the 
2012 proportions of debt and equity. Setting asset volatility to .075 may be conservative; Damodaran 
reports volatility of bank assets of 29 percent.  
                                                     
18 Using a derivatives pricing model is generally the most accurate way to value call options, and it is a frequently-
used approach in practice. 
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Another important but unobservable parameter is the liability-to-equity threshold for capital calls.  
The threshold rule is based on the EBRD’s stated requirement that equity be maintained at a level of at 
least 50 percent of risky assets. However, it is restated for this analysis in terms of a maximum liability-
to-equity ratio that triggers a call.19 The distribution of the size of the equity infusions when capital is 
called depends on multiple parameters, but most importantly on asset volatility; the level that the liability-
to-equity ratio is restored to when new capital is added; and how often the threshold condition is checked. 
In the base case, equity is restored to 45 percent of liabilities, which is typical for that ratio for the EBRD 
over the last five years. Risky asset values are shocked monthly, but the threshold condition is checked 
only quarterly. The trigger is checked only quarterly to capture policy inertia and the fact that financial 
statements tend to be updated at that frequency. 
Under the base case parameterization, the cost of total callable capital over a 20-year horizon is 
EUR 7.2 billion.20 The call option is exercised in about 6 percent of years. As is to be expected, the cost 
of the option is considerably less than the amount of callable capital outstanding (which stands at EUR 
23.4 billion), but is nevertheless significant. The estimate is sensitive to the various modeling assumptions 
and in particular to the assumed volatility of assets. For example, if average asset volatility is lowered to 
3.75% then the cost falls to EUR 2.7 billion and the call is exercised in 1.4% of years; and if volatility is 
increased to 10 percent then the cost rises to EUR 11.8 billion and the call is exercised in 9.7% of years.  
More generally, the calculation underscores why omitting the cost of contingent credit liabilities from 




                                                     
19 The model tracks the market value of risky assets, not their book value. Stating the capital call trigger in terms of 
a maximum market asset to equity ratio can create the perverse situation where an increase in the market value of 
risky assets triggers a capital call. That problem is avoided by using a book liability ratio to express the trigger and 
target ratios. 
20 The present value of costs is calculated over a horizon truncated at 20 years for several reasons. One is that 
policies are unlikely to remain unchanged over long horizons, reducing the relevance of costs predicted to be 
incurred in the more distant future under current policy. Furthermore, with a longer horizon parameter uncertainty 
becomes more of an issue, and small errors in assumptions about growth rates or discount rates are compounded.  
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4.2 Tennessee Valley Authority 
TVA, the largest wholesale supplier of electricity in the United States, is wholly owned by the 
federal government. Its assets, which include coal-fired, nuclear and hydroelectric generators and an 
extensive transmission system, have a reported book value of $47.3 billion in 2012.21 
TVA funds its assets primarily through long-term debt issues to investors and also from earnings. 
Under the 1959 TVA Self-Financing Act, TVA is one of the few federal agencies in the U.S. that issues 
debt in its own name rather than through the U.S. Treasury. Its debt is subject to a cap, currently of $30 
billion. Despite a history of losses that have repeatedly threatened its solvency, its debt has maintained a 
rating of AAA and its borrowing costs have historically exceeded comparable maturity Treasury bonds by 
only about 40 basis points. As emphasized by Logue and MacAvoy (2003), the low borrowing cost 
reflects the implicit guarantee from the U.S. government on its debt obligations.22 Similarly to other 
government firms, TVA does not recognize in its financial statements any cost of the implicit guarantee 
provided by taxpayers.23  
The estimated market value of the annual subsidy associated with the implicit debt guarantee is 
calculated using a weighted average cost of capital approach parallel to that used for the EBRD in Section 
4.1.2.  The required return that investors would demand on TVA’s assets is based on the CAPM and the 
asset beta for electrical utilities. Following Logue and MacAvoy, the asset beta is taken to be 0.6. The 
market risk premium is fixed at 6.5 percent, a standard assumption for this parameter. The 3-month T-bill 
rate, which varies across years, represents the risk-free rate. For example, the required return on assets is 
estimated to be 3.93 percent: .0003 + .6(.065) for 2012. Applying that to the book value of assets (and 
hence approximating the market value of assets by the reported book value), a fair return to TVA’s 
                                                     
21 TVA reports under GAAP, and is not required to report on the fair value of its operating assets. 
22 See Logue and MacAvoy (2003) for a more complete description of the history and operations of TVA. 
23 The implicit guarantee on its debt is one of several types of direct and indirect government subsidies TVA 
receives. The company does not pay corporate taxes on earnings, nor does it pay local or state property taxes. It does 
make payments equal to 5 percent of revenues in lieu of taxes to the counties and states which house the system, but 
on net it receives a tax subsidy. TVA is restricted to operating within its service area, where it has a legislatively 
enforced monopoly. Its pension fund, which was underfunded by $4.9 billion in 2012, also is thought to have an 
implicit government guarantee. 
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investors debt and equity holders collectively would be (.0393)($47,334 million) = $1.860 billion. TVA 
reports a borrowing cost of 5.08 percent on debt of $25,078, for a total capital cost of $1.273 billion. The 
difference between the fair return to all investors and the borrowing costs is the unreported capital cost: 
$587 million in 2012. Table 4.4 shows the result of that calculation for the years 2008 to 2012. Over that 
period, the understatement of capital costs totaled about $3 billion. 
The understatement of capital costs in TVA’s financial statements has been mitigated in recent 
years by the interaction of two factors: the long average maturity of about 17 years for TVA debt; and 
interest rates on average have declined over the last two decades. To abstract from those effects, Table 4.4 
also shows what the understatement of capital costs would have been had TVA borrowed anew each year 
at the prevailing AAA bond rate.24 Under that counterfactual, the understatement of capital costs over the 
2008 to 2012 period would have been $4.38 billion. 
 
Table 4.4: Unrecognized Capital Cost Subsidies to TVA 
 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 
Interest Expenses $1,273 $1,305 $1,294 $1,272 $1,376 
Book Assets $47,334 $46,393 $42,753 $40,017 $37,137 
Total Debt $25,078 $24,431 $23,424 $22,640 $22,619 
Borrowing cost 5.08% 5.34% 5.52% 5.62% 6.08% 
Risk Free Rate (3 month t-bill) 0.03% 0.15% 0.06% 0.13% 2.75% 
20-year Constant Maturity Treasury 
+50bps  
3.20% 4.78% 5.00% 3.96% 4.85% 
Market risk premium 6.50% 6.50% 6.50% 6.50% 6.50% 
Asset Beta 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Required Return on Assets 3.93% 4.05% 3.96% 4.03% 6.65% 
Unrecognized capital subsidy at historical 
interest rates 
$587 $574 $399 $341 $1,094 
Unrecognized capital subsidy at current 
interest rates 
$1,058 $711 $522 $716 $1,373 
 
All dollar amounts are in millions 
 
 
                                                     
24 The AAA bond rate is based on the 20-year constant maturity Treasury rate plus 50 basis points. 
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The understatement of capital costs is under current accounting conventions invisible to TVA’s 
managers and to policymakers. TVA is accounted for by U.S. budgetary agencies on a cash basis, which 
does not discriminate between revenues, expenses and capital expenditures, and which excludes capital 
charges except to the extent that interest payments reduce revenues. Specifically, the effect of TVA on the 
reported surplus is the difference between revenues (e.g., from electricity sales), and operating expenses 
plus capital expenditures.  Statements in TVA’s 2013 Budget Proposal support the contention that TVA’s 
management does not perceive the implicit guarantee on TVA’s debt as a cost. It states that: “TVA has 
not received federal government appropriations since 1999. Additionally, TVA makes annual returns to 
the U.S. Treasury on the government’s original $1.4 billion appropriated investments in the power 
program. Through fiscal year FY 2014, TVA expects to have paid approximately $3.7 billion, principal 
and interest, to the U.S. Treasury.” 
The understatement of TVA’s cost of capital in its accounting statements and the omission of a 
capital charge to recognize the cost of the risk to taxpayers in the federal budget almost certainly has real 
effects on regional electrical consumption and on TVA’s investment policies. Under the TVA Act of 
1933, the company is required to deliver a reliable supply of power (and a variety of other public services 
such as flood control) at the lowest possible rates to consumers. Because rates are set with the goal of 
recovering costs, the definition of costs affects electrical rates and hence the demand for electricity. The 
subsidized borrowing rate in itself reduces perceived costs and hence utility rates, which increases 
demand relative to its unsubsidized level. To the extent that different power generating technologies 
embody different amounts of market risk, the focus on its borrowing rate as its cost of capital distorts 
choices between alternative types of generating capacity. 
 
4.3 European Financial Stability Facility and European Stability Mechanism 
 
The EFSF was created in May 2010 in response to the Eurozone crisis. It was structured as a 
temporary rescue mechanism with the mandate of safeguarding financial stability in Europe by providing 
financial assistance to euro area Member States. In October 2010, EFSF participants decided to create a 
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permanent rescue mechanism, the ESM. The ESM has the same membership, mission and structure as the 
EFSF. Going forward, any new assistance will be funded and managed by the ESM. However, the EFSF 
will continue to administer and fund ongoing programmes for Greece, Portugal and Ireland. For the 
purposes of this analysis, they are effectively a consolidated enterprise (and referred to as EFSF/ESM). 
The EFSF/ESM has authority to issue bonds or other debt instruments on the capital markets. 
Member capital and callable capital allow it to maintain a high credit rating (currently AA+) and hence to 
borrow at favorable interest rates.25 Paid-in capital is invested in low-risk and liquid securities to serve as 
a buffer for losses. New debt is issued to make loans to member countries experiencing or threatened by 
severe financing problems and agreeing to the conditions set. The funds may also be used to purchase 
bonds in the primary or secondary bond markets, to fund precautionary assistance in the form of a credit 
line, and to finance recapitalisations of financial institutions through loans to governments.  
Financial information on the EFSF/ESM is available from the ESM’s 2012 Annual Report and 
the websites of both organizations. To date, the bulk of assistance has gone to Greece, Portugal and 
Ireland. For those countries, Table 4.5 summarizes the disbursed amounts (which total EUR 168 billion) 
and remaining amounts authorized (which total EUR 18.9 billion) as of July 2013. The ESM has also 
provided financial assistance to Spain for the recapitalisation of its financial sector, and is providing 
funding to Cyprus.  
 
Table 4.5: EFSF Amounts Disbursed and Available 
   
Already disbursed 
Remaining amount 
available Max. total 
  Ireland 14.4 3.3 17.7 
 Portugal 21.1 4.9 26 
 Greece 133.04 10.66 144.6* 
In € billion 
*Includes EUR 0.95bn of a facility whose availability period has ended.  
                                                     
25 The bonds are also eligible for purchase by the ECB. 
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A measure of the maximum prospective exposure of ESM members under current agreements is 
remaining subscribed capital available to be called, which stands at EUR 620 billion. (However, the rules 
allow for increasing that amount if certain conditions are met.26) To date, EUR 80 billion has been paid 
in. The largest top 5 subscriptions account for 83 percent of the total in each category.27  
The prospective fair-value cost to EFSF/ESM members is measured here as the present value of 
expected future capital calls over a horizon of 20 years, as was done for the EBRD earlier.28 The 
calculations employ a derivatives-pricing approach, implemented with a modified version of the EBRD 
model. However, estimating cost for the EFSF/ESM is more challenging, and there is more uncertainty 
associated with the estimates.  
Capital calls by the EFSF/ESM are likely to be less frequent but larger when they occur than for a 
development bank, because they are associated with particularly negative shocks to Eurozone economies 
and financial markets. Hence, the growth rate of the ESM’s future assets and liabilities is likely to be 
highly variable, with long periods of no growth or shrinkage as existing loans are paid off, followed by a 
rapid balance sheet expansion in the course of a year or two if a major crisis were to develop. The amount 
of new assistance forthcoming not only depends on financial market developments, but also on policy 
decisions of the EFSF/ESM in terms of what countries to assist and in what amounts. In most years there 
will be little new activity because episodes of the sort the EFSF/ESM is designed to protect against are 
rare. Crises are likely to occur when the European and world economies are weak and the cost of capital 
is relatively high, and clearly the activities entail considerable undiversifiable risk, but the fair value cost 
of risk during a crisis is hard to determine.29 Furthermore, the EFSF/ESM’s loans outstanding are much 
less diversified than that of a typical development bank, and may experience discontinuous losses in value 
                                                     
26 It takes unanimous agreement among members for certain major changes including making capital calls. 
However, there is an emergency voting procedure that brings the required share-weighted approval rate down to 
85% if the EC or ECB think there is an event that would threaten the economic and financial stability of the euro 
area. 
27 The largest subscribers are: Germany EUR 190 billion; France EUR 142 billion; Italy EUR 125 billion, Spain 
EUR 83 billion; and Netherlands EUR 40 billion. 
28 Related analysis (CBO, 2010, and Veronesi and Zingales, 2010), examine the cost of facilities created by the U.S. 
government to respond to the 2007 financial crisis. 
29 In this analysis no risk premium is attributed to jump risk, which imparts a conservative bias to the cost estimates. 
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when borrowers experience new difficulties. Unlike for smaller government firms, general equilibrium 
effects the ESM’s actions also must be taken into account, at least informally. Importantly, the presence 
of the ESM may reduce the likelihood of future financial distress relative to the past. To the extent 
possible, effect of the policy on the probabilities of future events and losses should be reflected in the 
choice of model parameters.  
Despite those complicating factors, it is informative to model the prospective cost of the 
programme and to consider the implied costs over a range of parameterizations.  A relatively simple 
approach is taken here that is intended to illustrate the range of possible costs rather than a definitive 
estimate. The model could be expanded to incorporate more information about the size of exposures of 
individual members, differences in the probabilities of requiring assistance, and a more explicit 
correlation structure between them, but that is left to future research. 
To adapt the EBRD model for the EFSF/ESM, stochastic jump processes are incorporated that 
govern the probability and severity of upward jumps in the size of its balance sheet, and that allow 
downward jumps to existing risky asset values.  Incorporating jump processes is one way to incorporate 
the idea that the tails of the relevant distributions are fatter than those of normal distributions. In the base 
case, the jump process is set to trigger a crisis in about 6 percent of years. That frequency was chosen 
based on the observation that large international crises such as the Great Depression or Great Recession 
occur at a lower rate, but that for countries and regions serious financial problems have historically arisen 
more frequently.30 Consistent with EFSF/ESM’s policies, balance sheet growth caused by the jumps is 
modeled as being financed with additional debt issuance. Capital calls are triggered in the model when the 
ratio of liabilities-to-equity rises above a threshold level. That ratio may rise either because of balance 
sheet growth financed with debt issues, or because of a drop in the value of existing assets. Capital 
                                                     
30 Some might argue that the likelihood of a crisis in the Eurozone over the next few years is much higher, given the 
imbalances and stresses in the system. The model can accommodate a time-varying probability of a crisis, but such 
cases were not explicitly examined. However, the sensitivity analysis shows that an increase in the assumed 




infusions are invested in safe assets, and enough capital is called to restore the target liability-to equity 
ratio.  The model and its parameterization are described more fully in Appendix 2.   
The cost of undiversifiable risk is incorporated in the pricing of the callable capital through the 
assumption about the risk premium on risky assets. The expected return on risky assets is set at 2.7% over 
the risk-free rate, and 2% over the EFSF/ESM’s borrowing rate (which is also assumed to be higher than 
the short-term risk-free rate, consistent with observed yields). EFSF/ESM purchases of distressed 
sovereign claims are likely to occur when those assets have been trading in the market at spreads in 
excess of the assumed risk premium. However, consistent with the idea that fair values exclude any 
distress or abnormal liquidity premium, and taking into account that observed spreads contain 
compensation for expected losses as well as a risk premium, the spread is chosen to be in line with bonds 
on the border between investment and non-investment grade.  
Under the base case parameterization, the fair value cost to member governments of providing 
callable capital over 20 years is EUR 36 billion. However, that estimate is quite sensitive to changes in 
the assumed parameter values. Table 4.6 reports the cost estimates for a variety of parameterizations, with 
each row showing the effects on cost of changing one parameter at a time. All other parameters are held at 
their base case values, which are listed in Appendix Table A2.1. Altering one parameter at a time 
highlights which assumptions the model is most and least sensitive to.31 The assumed frequency and 
severity of a crisis has the largest effect on predicted cost, whereas the estimates are relatively insensitive 
to the parameters driving portfolio risk during non-crisis periods. That is to be expected; the target 
amount of equity capital to risky loans already acquired is high and the risk of needing equity beyond 
what has already been paid in to absorb losses is low. However, new crises tend to trigger the need for 
large capital infusions.   
The sensitivity analysis suggests that the cost of current callable capital commitments is likely to 
be in the range of 20 to 80 billion euros for a plausible range of parameter values, and depending most 
                                                     
31 Combinations of parameter variations are also not considered because information is not available to inform 
assumptions about their joint distribution.  
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critically on the assessed probability and severity of future crises.32 Some might argue that the current 
imbalances and stresses in the Eurozone system make the likelihood of a crisis over the next few years 
higher than the 6% annual rate assumed in the base case.  Increasing the assumed frequency to a 9% rate 
doubles the estimated cost of the callable capital relative to the base case, and put it near the high end of 
the range considered.33 By contrast, in its financial statements (which consolidate the finances of the 
EFSF and the ESM), the ESM shows a modest loss of EUR 498 million, none of which is related to 
prospective costs. The budgetary treatment of paid-in and callable capital by member countries has not 
been verified, but it is probable that callable capital is off-budget and hence effectively is treated as 
having no cost. Of course the benefits of having a safety net in place may far outweigh the estimated cost, 
but that can only be determined when information about cost is made available. 
The reported cost estimates are based on an average over many Monte Carlo simulations. Figure 
1 shows the distribution of cost estimates across 5,000 Monte Carlo simulations. The modal outcome is 
that the EFSF/ESM makes no capital calls over a 20-year period. However, there is a long right tail, and 
outcomes of over EUR 100 billion are observed in about 2% of runs.  
The lack of recognition of the cost of capital by the EFSF/ESM has a direct effect on the pricing 
of assistance to member countries. The EFSF/ESM’s philosophy about cost recovery is prominently 
stated in its Annual Report: “The ESM does not aim to generate profit on financial support granted to 
beneficiary member states.” In keeping with that policy, and with the standard practice of government 
institutions of treating taxpayer equity capital as costless, the ESM charges interest rates on the risky 
loans that it makes that effectively pass through its own borrowing costs plus a small spread to cover 
administrative expenses. A 200 bps penalty rate is imposed on delinquent loans. Adding to the opacity of 
costs, the EFSF/ESM’s financial reporting is much less revealing than that of a typical multilateral 
                                                     
32 No probabilities are associated with different values in the reported range because of the difficulty of assessing the 
probability of crisis states, of alternative ESM policy reaction functions, and so forth. The range of parameter values 
considered was chosen to cover a plausible range for each component, taking into account factors such as the 
historical frequency of financial crises.  
33The model can accommodate a time-varying probability of a crisis, but to more cleanly demonstrate the 
magnitudes of the effect of parameter changes on the predicted costs, such scenarios are not reported.  
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development bank. The EFSF/ESM did not adopt IPSASB guidelines, and notably, it omits a fair value 
balance sheet from its financial statements. 
 
Table 4.6: Prospective Cost and Call Probability for EFSF/ESM Callable Capital  
     Sensitivity to Key Parameters  
(EUR billions) 
Annual crisis probability 0 .03 .06 .09 
Cost    0 19 38 59 
Annual call probability 0.0% 1.5% 3.2% 5.0% 
 
Risky asset multiplier in crisis 1.25x 1.5x 1.75x 2x 
Cost 12 38 65 92 
Annual call probability  0.9% 3.2% 4.6% 5.2% 
 
Asset jump frequency, annual, 
no crisis 
0 .05 .1 .2 
Cost 38 38 39 39 
Annual call probability  3.0% 3.1% 3.3% 3.4% 
 
Risky asset volatility (non-
jump component), annual 
.05 .1 .15 .2 
Cost 34 36 38 42 
Annual call probability 2.8% 3.0% 3.2% 3.7% 
 
Trigger liabilities-to-equity 
(relative to target ratio) 
1.05x 1.1x 1.2x 1.3x 
Cost 41 40 38 35 
Annual call probability 5.3% 4.3% 3.2% 2.4% 




5. Implementation challenges 
Even if a switch by governments to fair value accounting for credit support is advantageous in 
principle, whether it would be an improvement over the status quo would depend in part on the quality of 
the implementation.  Practical challenges include the need to establish rules for selecting methodologies 
for a variety of applications; the possibility that fair value estimates would be less transparent and more 
manipulable than ones based on simpler rules; and the costs of educating government analysts on how to 
prepare and communicate fair value estimates to policymakers and the public. Political resistance to 
disclosing higher budgetary costs is likely to be an obstacle as well, although a constituency for greater 
government transparency also exists. These issues are briefly discussed in this section and deserve more 
attention than in future studies. 
It appears that many practical concerns could be addressed by the adoption of the accounting 
standards and practices that have developed to guide and discipline the production of fair value estimates 
by private sector financial institutions.  Because fair value calculations play such a prominent role in the 
private sector (in mandated financial disclosures as well as in transactional analyses), valuation and 
accounting consultancies have developed considerable expertise in the available methodologies and in 
model-building, and something of a consensus has emerged about the best practices for a variety of 
applications. That foundation could be drawn on by governments to provide discipline and consistency to 
fair value cost estimates, as a source of private contractors to assist in model building and auditing, and as 
a resource for educating government employees. Another mitigating factor is that most government credit 
support is provided through large and ongoing programmes. Once models and approaches are established 
and vetted for a given program, the incremental costs of producing fair value estimates should be similar 
to that of preparing accrual estimates using government rates for discounting.  
For guarantee programs such as the EFSF/ESM that involve the insurance of tail risk, there will 
always be differences of opinion on modeling assumptions and little data to resolve them.  Certainly that 
has been the experience with the stress-testing that has been mandated for systemically risky banks.  
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Nevertheless, in such cases the modeling exercise provides important information that is absent for 
guarantees under current practice that only quantifies ex post costs.   
Manipulation is a legitimate worry, but arguably a switch to fair value accounting would make it 
easier to detect than under the status quo of discounting at government interest rates. Government entities 
release little or no information about the cash flow forecasts that underlie their reported accrual estimates, 
and those cash flow forecasts are at least as easily manipulated as the choice of discount rates. The 
plausibility of fair value cost estimates tends to be easier to assess when data is available on the pricing of 
similar private sector transactions (e.g., for mortgages). By contrast, meaningful comparisons based on 
market pricing data are not possible when governments use their own borrowing rates for discounting. 
 It is difficult to predict whether the political consensus that is needed to implement such 
accounting changes will emerge. Two observations suggest that it might: One is the adoption of IFRS 
standards (which have increasingly embraced fair value concepts) by the International Public Sector 
Accounting Standards Board. Another is the steps taken that direction in by U.S., including the adoption 
of fair value estimates in the budgetary process for select programmes, and the passage of a bill in the 
House of Representatives that mandates fair value accounting for credit programmes. Research leading to 
greater awareness of the bias toward cost understatement and its consequences could also change 
perceptions among policymakers about the advisability of change.  
 
5.1 Would Fuller Recognition of Capital Costs Improve Incentives for Public Managers? 
Whether the benefits of implementing a switch to a fair value accounting regime would outweigh 
the costs depends among other things on whether it would result in better decision-making by public 
sector managers and policymakers. Some evidence that it could be beneficial in that regard is found in the 
experiences of private sector firms that have adopted a measure of “economic value added” or EVA.  
A switch to evaluating the profitability of government firms net of its weighted average cost of 
capital (rather than net of borrowing cost) would be akin to the practice in the private sector of using an 
EVA approach to evaluating managerial performance.  EVA was popularized in the 1990s as a way to 
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better align managers’ incentives for investment choices with stockholder interests. Rogerson (1997) 
demonstrates the theoretical potential for improvement; he shows that in a variety of settings with 
asymmetric information between principals and managers, incentive contrasts based on EVA can elicit 
first best behavior by managers.   
Evidence on the effects of EVA adoption by private sector firms suggests that decision-making in 
the public sector might be improved by a fuller recognition of the cost of capital. For example, Daske et. 
al. (2013) find that the seriousness with which firms rely on EVA principles varies, but that serious 
adopters exhibit superior performance. The incentives facing public and private sector managers clearly 
would remain different, particularly because government pay is more weakly tied to performance than in 
private firms. Nevertheless, one would expect that if managers received more accurate signals from 
accounting data about firm profitability, project choices at least on the margin would be improved. 
 
6. Conclusions and areas for further research 
 
Accounting data--budgetary cost estimates and financial statement entries--comprise the price 
system facing policymakers. This paper makes the case for the importance of providing the most accurate 
available price signals about the costs of credit support, and for using fair value cost estimates to do so, 
particularly for budgeting purposes. A look at the accounting policies of OECD governments reveals the 
wide gap between that recommendation and current practice: For many types of credit support little or no 
cost information is provided, and reported costs are systematically and often significantly understated. 
Analyses of the EFSF/ESM, EBRD and TVA illustrate the magnitude of the disparities between 
fair value estimates and the costs currently reported by governments. These examples also demonstrate 
the feasibility of developing fair value estimates even for relatively complex credit support arrangements. 
However, the analyses presented here are not intended to be the final word on the costs of any of these 
programmes, and it is possible that other approaches or assumptions could improve the estimates. What is 
important is that while there is significant uncertainty around any of the point estimates, in contrast to 
official figures, there is no reason to suspect a systematic upward or downward bias in the estimates. 
37 
 
Furthermore, the exercise of model-building is useful in identifying costs and risks that might be 
otherwise overlooked. Although adoption of fair value accounting for credit support by governments 
would involve additional costs and challenges, the infrastructure developed to support fair value reporting 
by private sector firms could be used as a source of expertise and to provide discipline to the process of 
cost estimation.         
The most striking results are for the EFSF/ESM, where the cost of the outstanding amount of 
subscribed callable capital to member countries is estimated to be in the range of 20 and 80 billion euros 
(depending on one’s assessment of the likelihood and severity of future crises), but for which no cost is 
reported by the EFSF/ESM or by member countries in their budgets. The cost of subscribed callable 
capital for the EBRD is similarly absent from government reports, but it is estimated here to be about 
EUR 7 billion on a fair value basis.  A calculation of EBRD’s capital costs on an annual basis shows a 
fair value financing cost that is about three times the cost of debt financing that appears in the EBRD’s 
income statement. For TVA, the cost of capital for 2012, inclusive of the implicit government guarantee 
of its debt, is estimated to be $587 million more than the borrowing costs that appear in its income 
statement.  
 The analysis suggests several fruitful directions for future research. A foundational project would 
be to compile a comprehensive inventory of credit support for all OECD countries and international 
financial institutions, along with the rules governing their budgetary and accounting treatments.34 
Relatedly, subnational government credit support activities and account procedures, e.g., credit extension 
by local governments, could be systematically investigated. Compiling that information in one place and 
on a consistent basis would shed light on the total amounts of credit support and the exposures of 
different governments. It would also lay the groundwork for other researchers and policy analysts to 
                                                     
34 A first step would be to define the scope of what constitutes credit support, for instance, whether or not to count 
the implicit guarantees that are widely expected to be honored but that do not have legal standing. Challenges would 
include defining categories of credit that cut across the classifications used by different governments, and 
representing the size of the obligations in a way that is most comparable across types of support.  
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undertake more detailed analyses of the costs and risks of government credit support, including the 
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Modeling the Cost of Callable Capital for the EBRD 
 
The cost of callable capital for the EBRD is estimating using a derivatives pricing model, 
implemented using Monte Carlo simulation. This Appendix describes the logic and main equations 
behind the model, and lists the base case parameters. The code, which is in VBA, is available upon 
request. 
A risk-neutral version of the model is used for valuation, and a corresponding set of equations 
with actual expected returns and therefore actual probabilities is used to calculate the physical probability 
of default. (Only the equations for the risk-neutral representation are shown here.) The EBRD’s assets are 
divided into safe and risky ones. The time evolution of the risky assets follows a log-normal process: 
 
(A1.1)  [ ]hhrExpAA tAtAftht εσσ ,2, )5.( +−=+  
 
where h is the time step, which is set to one month, t subscripts represent time,  rf is the risk-free rate, σA,t, 
is the volatility of risky assets, and ε is a draw from a standard normal distribution. The volatility 
parameter is subscripted by time because the model accommodates time-varying volatility.35 The 
corresponding actual evolution of risky assets follows the same process, but with their expected return (as 
described earlier) in place of  rf .  
The risk-neutral evolution of the safe assets held for liquidity is deterministic: 
 
(A1.2)  [ ]hrExpBB ftht =+  
 
The corresponding actual process is also deterministic but assumes a 50 bps higher return on the assets. 
The existence of a positive spread on assets that are treated as being risk-free can be interpreted as a 
liquidity premium; it is included in order to make the assumed rates of return on the bank’s liquid asset 
                                                     
35 Volatility is assumed to be constant in the reported results. However, Lucas and McDonald (2006) shows that if 
managers substitute towards riskier assets when equity is low, the estimated cost of a government guarantee may be 
significantly higher than under the assumption of constant volatility.  
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portfolio more realistic. Notice that no dividends are paid to equity holders; returns on assets are assumed 
to be reinvested in the bank, as appears to be historical practice. Therefore in the model, actual bank 
assets grow on average over time at the expected rate of return on investments. An assumption of faster or 
slower growth would affect the cost estimates. 
 To capture the rebalancing between risky and liquid asset that occurs over time as loans mature or 
liquid securities are sold and replaced by new investments, the model incorporates a periodic partial 
adjustment towards the target asset mix. The adjustment rate is assumed to be asymmetric, with desired 
increases in risky asset holdings occurring more rapidly than desired decreases in risky asset holdings. As 
for callable capital, adjustments occur quarterly. Upward adjustments of the risky asset-to-equity ratio 
move 50% of the way to the target for that ratio over the course of a year, whereas downward adjustments 
move only 3% to the target. The target ratio is close to the actual ratios reported for 2011 and 2012. The 
adjustment rates are chosen to capture the idea that it is fairly easy to sell liquid assets and reinvest them 
in riskier ones, but there may not be enough desirable risky projects available to immediately restore the 
target asset mix. The rate of downward adjustment is assumed to be much slower because of the difficulty 
of liquidating risky and opaque bank loans. Allowing for adjustment to the asset mix maintains a more 
stable and realistic ratio of risky assets-to-equity than if no adjustments were allowed. A faster speed of 
downward adjustment would lower the estimated cost of callable capital, whereas a faster speed of 
upward adjustment would increase the cost. However, the cost estimates are similar to what is reported in 
the base case for modest changes to the assumed adjustment speeds.  
 Debt liabilities, L, are assumed to increase deterministically at a rate equal to the interest rate paid 
on them (with the same 50 bps difference between the risk-neutral and actual processes as for liquid 
assets): 
 
(A1.3)  [ ]hrExpLL ftht =+  
 
Because the rate paid on the debt is the same as the rate earned on liquid assets held, an increase in liquid 
asset holdings has an equivalent effect on cost as an equal-value decrease in debt. The specification 
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implies that interest paid out is financed by additional debt issues, so that debt outstanding grows over 
time. Equity is then calculated as the difference between assets and liabilities: 
(A1.4)  tttt LBAE −+=  
 Capital is called when the ratio of liabilities-to-equity, Lt/Et, exceeds the trigger, which is based 
on interpreting the statutory requirement that equity be maintained at a level of at least 50 percent of 
(book) banking assets as corresponding most closely in the model to a relation between liabilities and 
equity. The condition for whether the trigger is tripped is checked quarterly, reflecting that monitoring 
and the production of new information about asset values is fairly infrequent. When capital is called, it is 
in an amount that restores the target liability-to equity ratio. The new capital is assumed to be initially 
invested entirely in risk-free liquid assets. 
 The logic of the Monte Carlo simulation is as follows: At the beginning of each Monte Carlo run, 
variables are initialized to the values of risky and riskless assets and liabilities in 2012. Each month going 
forward over a 20-year period, a draw of a standard normal random variable, scaled by σA, determines the 
evolution of risky assets according to equation A1.1. Safe assets, liabilities and equity evolve according to 
A1.2, A1.3, and A1.4 respectively. Every quarter, Lt/Et is compared to the trigger value for a capital call.  
If the trigger is tripped, equity is called in an amount that restores Lt/Et to its target ratio. Also every 
quarter, the ratio At/Et is compared to its target value, and the mix of risky and risk-free assets are adjusted 
towards the target for that ratio according to the adjustment rule described above. Along each Monte 
Carlo path, the amount and timing of each capital call is recorded, and the payments are discounted to 
time 0 using the risk-free rate in the risk-neutral representation of the model. The reported fair value cost 
of the guarantee is the average cost over the 10,000 Monte Carlo runs. The physical call probabilities are 
based on the results of applying the same shocks to the evolution of actual risky assets and averaging over 





Table A1.1: Parameters for EBRD Callable Capital Model 
Name Base Case Value 
Number Monte Carlo runs 10,000 
Time horizon  20 years 
Risk-free rate, rf (annual) .003 
Return on liquid assets and liabilities, rB (annual) .0078 
Expected return on risky assets, E(rA) (annual) .0198 
Initial liquid assets, B0 (EUR millions) 26,528 
Initial risky assets, A0 (EUR millions) 25,487 
Initial liabilities, L0 (EUR millions) 37,106 
Volatility risky assets, σA .15 
Liability-to-equity target 2.91/1 
Liability-to-equity trigger 2.24/1 
Target risky asset-to-equity ratio for rebalancing asset mix 1/.65 
Adjustment rate of At/Et to target when At/Et > target .03 





Modeling the Cost of Callable Capital for the EFSF/ESM 
 
 Estimates of the cost of callable capital are derived using a variant on the model for the EBRD. 
Apart from a recalibration and rule changes that reflect policy differences, the main technical change is 
the incorporation of two jump processes. The first process represents the occurrence of a crisis (i.e., an 
event that triggers the purchase of additional assets) in the Eurozone, and the second allows for a discrete 
downward jump in the value of existing balance sheet loans. The probability of a downward jump in the 
value of existing assets is assumed to increase during a crisis. Those jumps effectively create a fatter 
lower tail for asset values than if they were normally distributed. The occurrence of a crisis causes the 
purchase of additional risky assets, and an equal increase in debt liabilities. Existing loans amortize over 
time, but there is no rebalancing between risky and risk-free assets. 
Under a risk-neutral representation in discrete time, risky assets (generally taking the 
form of risky sovereign debt) on balance sheet evolve according to: 
(A2.1)   [ ] ttCttAtAtjftttJht AIAhhprExpAIA ∆+−+−−+=+ ,,2,, )5.()1( αεσσωω
           
 
where h is the time step (taken to be one month in the simulations), t subscripts represent time, rf 
is the risk-free rate, σA,t is the possibly time-dependent normally distributed component of the 
volatility of asset value, ε is a draw from a standard normal distribution,  ω is the non-stochastic 
jump size, IJ,t is an indicator that a jump in existing assets has occurred (the probability of which 
jumps up during a crisis), pJh is the probability of a jump over an interval of length h, α is the 
constant fraction of balance sheet assets repaid each period, IC,t is an indicator that a crisis 
occurs, and Δ is the increase in risky assets during a crisis, based on the amount currently on 
ESM’s balance sheet inflated at a 2% annual growth rate. The actual evolution of risky assets is 
identical except that rf is replaced by the expected return on assets rA.  
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New equity from capital calls is invested in liquid assets. The risk-neutral evolution of liquid 
assets is:  
(A2.2)   [ ]hrExpBB Dtht =+  
 
The rate earned, rD, is the same rate paid by ESFS/ESM on their debt. Notice that no dividends are paid to 
equity holders; asset returns are assumed to be reinvested in the bank. Debt liabilities, L, increase 
deterministically at a rate equal to the interest rate paid on them, and decline by the amounts repaid each 
period as risky assets are retired. They also increase by the amount of new assets purchased during a 
crisis:  
 
(A2.3)  [ ] ttCtDtht AIAhrExpLL ∆+−+=+ ,α  
 
Equity is then calculated as the difference between assets and liabilities: 
(A2.4)  tttt LBAE −+=  
 Capital is called when the ratio of liabilities-to-equity, Lt/Et, exceeds the trigger, which is 
assumed in the base case to be 20% higher than the target for this ratio. The target is taken to be the 
current ratio of liabilities to equity. The condition for whether the trigger is tripped is checked quarterly. 
When capital is called, it is in an amount that restores the target liability-to equity ratio. The new capital is 
assumed to be initially invested entirely in liquid assets. 
 The logic of the Monte Carlo simulation is as follows: At the beginning of each Monte Carlo run, 
variables are initialized to the values of risky and riskless assets and liabilities. Each month going forward 
over a 20-year period, a draw of a standard normal random variable, scaled by σA, determines the normal 
component of the evolution of risky assets according to equation A2.1. Two draws from a uniform 
distribution each month determine whether there is a crisis and an increase in risky asset holdings, and 
whether there is a jump down in the value of existing risky assets. Safe assets, liabilities and equity 
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evolve according to A2.2, A2.3, and A2.4 respectively. Every quarter, Lt/Et is compared to the trigger 
value for a capital call.  If the trigger is tripped, equity is called in an amount that restores Lt/Et to its 
target ratio. Along each Monte Carlo path, the amount and timing of each capital call is recorded, and the 
payments are discounted to time 0 using the risk-free rate in the risk-neutral representation of the model. 
The reported fair value cost of the guarantee is the average cost over the 20,000 Monte Carlo runs. The 
physical call probabilities are based on the results of applying the same shocks to the evolution of actual 
risky assets and averaging over the Monte Carlo runs. Table A2.1 lists the main parameter values used in 
the base case calculations. 
 
 
Table A2.1: Parameters for EFSF/ESM Callable Capital Model 
Name Base Case Value 
Number Monte Carlo runs 20,000 
Time horizon 20 years 
Risk-free rate, rf (annual) .003 
Return on ESM debt and liquid assets, rB (annual) .01 
Fair value expected return on risky assets (annual) .03 
Initial liquid assets, B0 (EUR millions) 80,000 
Initial risky assets, A0 (EUR millions) 39,461 
Initial liabilities, L0 (EUR millions) 39,461 
Annual rate of asset repayment, α .027 
Volatility risky assets, σA non-jump component .15 
Probability crisis,  .06 
Risky asset multiplier if crisis, Δ  1.5x 
Probability jump down in risky assets, pJ, non-crisis, annual 10% 
Probability jump down in risky assets, pJ, crisis, annual 25% 
Jump size as percent of risky assets in crisis, ω -20% 
Liability-to-equity target 39.461/80 
Liability-to-equity trigger 1.2 x target 
 
 
